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Technology Policy: A Fixture on the National Agenda 
 
Maine Policy Review (1995).  Volume 4, Number 2 
Federal government research and development priorities have shifted in recent years away from 
areas of national security and agency missions, and toward the enhancement of industrial 
competitiveness in the global economy. This shift has stirred ideological controversy over 
whether the federal government should be in the business of picking "winners" and "losers," 
even prompting some to label this practice “corporate welfare.” Authors Rycroft, Kash, and 
Adams suggest that the central issues at stake have little to do with ideological differences and a 
great deal to do with whether the U.S. will continue to lead the world in technological 
innovation. They describe a new economic reality--driven by technology--that calls for basic 
changes to our national technology policy.  
Robert W. Rycroft  
Don E. Kash  
Richard Adams  
Technology policy once again became a focus of national public debate in America in the early 
1980s. After brief and inconsequential appearances on the federal government’s agenda in the 
1960s and 1970s,1 technology policy now seems likely to be a permanent fixture. This is despite 
initial efforts by the Reagan administration and recent attempts by the Republican majority in 
Congress to bury it.2 The new permanence is a consequence of what James B. Conant called a 
paradigm shift in American society.3  
Technological innovation has become the most powerful causal force in the contemporary world. 
As the Clinton administration puts it: “Technology is the engine of economic growth, creating 
new jobs, building new industries, and improving our standard of living.”4 Initially manifested in 
the Cold War arms race, where it was seen as the key to our national security, technological 
innovation now permeates every aspect of our society. From pharmaceuticals to the information 
revolution to corn planters controlled by microprocessors, we are enveloped by technological 
innovation.  
Technology policy as presently debated was unpalatable to the Reagan administration and is 
distasteful to the new Republican Congress because it is concerned with commercialization. That 
is, at its core the debate hinges on whether the federal government should overtly promote the 
innovation of commercial technologies. A federal role in commercialization generates great 
passion among those at the ideological extremes because it requires blurring the public-private 
sector distinction that has long been a sacred icon in U.S. policy rhetoric.  
For ideological purists on both the left and right, technology policy has become a classic struggle 
between good and evil, and thus the debate has been characterized by black-and-white thinking. 
For those opposed to all but the most minimal government, public sector support for the 
commercialization of technologies is a sin. For those who believe government is integral to 
social well-being, technology policy is an opportunity for goodness. However, for the vast 
majority of Americans who come to the issue without ideological blinders, technology policy is 
an area of endless and confusing shades of gray.5  
Why has technology policy become a major focus of attention? The answer has little to do with 
grand ideological debates. Rather, two “real world” conditions explain the prominence of the 
controversy. First, as noted above, there is a consensus that technological innovation is the 
greatest source of economic well-being in the world. Second, the Japanese are threatening to take 
the lead in technological innovation away from the U.S.  
Over the last three decades, both the sources and markets for technologies have become global, 
and trade in manufactured goods has become the key indicator of a nation’s technological 
prowess. Trade performance is now a regular on the television evening news, and for good 
reason. In 1994 the U.S. ran a trade deficit in goods of $166.4 billion, $67.3 billion of which was 
with Japan. As an aside, it is worth noting that another $69.4 billion of the deficit was with the 
developing countries of East Asia 6 (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan), which have adopted much of the 
Japanese approach to technological innovation.7  
America’s uninterrupted trade deficit in goods since 1976 totals nearly $1.5 trillion.8 Other 
trends paint a similar picture. In the five years before the end of 1994, Japan’s total economic 
output rose from 55 percent of U.S. gross national product to nearly 70 percent. Japan now has 
56 percent of the world’s savings. As Eamonn Fingleton observes, “while the Western press has 
talked of collapse, Japan has quietly remained on track toward its reputed goal of surpassing the 
United States to become the world’s biggest economy by 2000.”9  
A focus on technology policy is one way the U.S. can deal with this grim situation. The key is 
manufactured goods, where the cumulative trade deficit between 1987 and 1993 was 
approximately $600 billion, more than 75 percent (some $400 billion) of which was with 
Japan.10 In the pages that follow, we investigate what a technology policy focused on 
manufacturing might look like.  
Policy for complex technologies  
Throughout most of the post World War II period, macroeconomics has generally guided policy 
with regard to trade in product technologies. Reduced to its fundamentals, the macroeconomic 
view says the way to deal with a trade deficit is to devalue the currency. If this once worked, it 
doesn’t anymore. Even with the nearly threefold devaluation of the dollar against the Japanese 
yen between 1985 and 1995, the U.S. manufacturers’ trade deficit grew. The expectation that 
U.S. bilateral trade with Japan would benefit from the declining value of the dollar has been 
countered in large part by the superior Japanese ability to innovate complex technologies.  
A complex technology is one which cannot be understood in detail by an individual expert.11 To 
illustrate, pharmaceuticals are simple product technologies while an aircraft is a complex product 
technology. In 1994 the majority of Japanese exports to the U.S. were complex product 
technologies (e.g., automobiles, semiconductors).12 A significant portion of the complex product 
technologies traded in the world marketplace result from fusing previously distinct technologies 
which were themselves very complex (e.g., opto-electronics).13  
The continued trade and competitiveness problems the U.S. has experienced have caused many 
leaders in American industry and in other institutions to support commercial technology policy 
despite their traditional distaste for government involvement in the economy. One of the curious 
divisions in the debate about technology policy is that a growing proportion of the leadership of 
major complex technological sectors support government intervention. It is not that public policy 
has suddenly acquired legitimacy on its own merits, but that these corporate leaders understand 
that in the new competitive world, foreign companies producing complex technologies have the 
active and effective support of their governments. This realization has led a growing number of 
corporate executives to advocate public-private partnerships as a requisite for enhanced national 
economic performance.14  
If policy is to distinguish between complex and simple technologies--to be responsive to the very 
different needs and circumstances of different techno-logical sectors--then it is no longer 
appropriate to speak of a generic technology policy. An across-the-board, one-size- fits-all 
approach is no longer viable. Conventional initiatives like sector-blind R&D expenditures or tax 
credits or broad intellectual property rights regimes will not only not work, but may be counter-
productive. More discriminating policies appear to be needed.  
An overview of the new technological reality can be had by looking at Figure 1. In that 
illustration we have located the thirty most valuable products traded in the international 
marketplace in 1970 and in 1990 into four cells. Each of these products has been classified in 
terms of a simple/complex division for both the products and the manufacturing processes which 
produce them.15 Note that in 1970, 58 percent of the value of the 30 most valuable manufactured 
goods were located in the simple/simple cell. By 1990, the value of the goods located in that cell 
had declined to twelve percent of the total. Note also that the thirty most valuable products in 
1970 represented 56 percent of the value of all manufactured goods traded in the international 
market, but by 1990 they constituted 63 percent of the total. Finally, 27 percent of the most 
valuable 1970 technologies had been displaced (largely by more complex alternatives) by 1990.  
Figure 1 says that manufactured goods are becoming more complex. At some intuitive level, 
Americans understand this. What is not so well understood, however, is that successful 
innovation of complex technologies depends on networks of organizations that are able to 
learn.16 Network organizational learning, in turn, depends on the ability to rapidly generate and 
move information, knowledge, and capabilities among the participants. Often this 
communication is under quite informal circumstances.17  
The existence of organizational networks with this capability for rapid knowledge creation and 
movement is critical because the economic winners in the complex technology arenas are those 
who are able to carry out incremental innovation ahead of their competitors. Nowhere is this 
point made clearer than in the patterns displayed in Figure 2. The figure displays a wide array of 
technologies and lists the countries where the initial breakthrough (R&D) took place. When this 
list is compared to the country in which the first commercialization of products occurred and 
then is compared to a list of those countries currently leading in advancing the technology, a 
clear pattern emerges. This is the Japanese success story graphically displayed. They have been 
able to dominate the downstream benefits that flow from incremental innovations of complex 
technologies.  
Two messages with regard to manufacturers' trade seem clear. First, the big profits in the future 
will go to those who are the most successful incremental innovators of complex technologies. 
Second, if the goal of technology policy is to improve the competitiveness of the United States, 
then a major focus of that policy must be with the creation and maintenance of the organizational 
networks that increasingly dominate the innovation of complex technologies. As technologies 
and organizations coevolve into ever more complex forms, the capacity to link diverse 
companies, university research facilities, and government laboratories has become a requisite. As 
James Metcalfe has argued, “technology policy is about institutions and their connectivity. "18  
Figure 1. The thirty most valuable exports: A 1970, 1990 comparison  
Simple Process/Simple Product Simple Process/Complex Product 
1970 = 58% 
($86,708,435)  
1990 = 12% 
($224,699,631) 
1970 = 0%   
1990 = 1% 
($25,549,954) 
1970 = 12% 
($17,906,225)   
1990 = 36% 
($644,454,846) 
1970 = 31% 
($46,021,270)  
1990 = 51% 
$919,266,926) 
Complex Process/Simple Product Complex Process/Complex Product 
Source: Kash. Don E. and Robert W. Rycroft. November/December 1993. "Nurturing Winners with Federal R & 
D." Technology Review p. 64.  
Interconnectedness would be significant if only because of the increasing demand everywhere 
for speed in the innovation process. But connectivity has become absolutely critical for complex 
technological sectors because of the growing significance of tacit or experiential knowledge for 
organizational learning. That is, organizational learning in complex sectors is more and more 
dependent on knowledge that cannot be written down and transmitted in cognitive ways. To use 
Walter Vincenti’s words, tacit knowledge is the “implicit, wordless, pictureless knowledge 
essential to engineering judgment and workers’ skills. "19  
Tacit knowledge and learning are more diffuse and more difficult to transfer than explicit 
knowledge because it is based in experience and know-how.20 And tacit knowledge is especially 
important for those process innovations (i.e., advances in manufacturing technology) that are 
increasingly dominating incremental innovation in complex sectors.21 Not surprisingly, it is in 
exactly this area that the Japanese seem to have such a striking advantage. That advantage flows, 
in part, from the characteristics of Japanese culture. What does that mean? It means that Japanese 
culture places a high value on a process of continuous incremental improvements which emerge 
from group-oriented innovation processes.  
Even the briefest look at Figure 2 shows the dominance of the U.S. and Europe as the source of 
major R&D breakthroughs. A similar pattern is quite obvious with regard to the introduction of 
the first technological products. In both of these areas, Japan’s record is weak. Evidence of this 
type has led to a popular perception in the West that the Japanese are not very creative or 
innovative. This view rests on defining creativity and innovativeness in terms of radical 
breakthroughs. It is becoming clear, however, that creativity and innovativeness in Japanese 
culture has always been concerned with adaptation, improvement, and enhancement and less 
focused on dramatic breakthroughs. Perhaps the best way to encapsulate why the Japanese 
appear to have a cultural advantage in the innovation of complex technologies is to quote Shuji 
Hayashi:  
Japanese are widely criticized for lacking creativity and being incorrigible imitators of foreign 
products. The standard apologia has been that Japan was a developing country and tried to catch 
up quickly by copying what westerners had created. I think national character is a better 
explanation. To say that we are talented at refining things is more accurate. In the philosophical 
dichotomy between the Ideal and the Real, Japanese favor the latter. Instead of a soaring flight of 
inventiveness that results in something totally new, our forte is a more pedestrian approach--the 
steady refinement of extant objects. Japanese are always implementing variation. Minor changes 
will do.22  
If it is true that Japanese culture tends to encourage incrementalism, it is also the case that it 
gives much higher value to accumulating tacit knowledge and to group processes which integrate 
diverse cognitive and tacit knowledge than is true in America. Given the critical significance of 
tacit knowledge and synthetic learning in the incremental innovation of complex technologies, 
again the Japanese cultural predisposition turns out to be a commercial advantage. This point is 
made nicely by Ikujiro Nonaka and Tim Ray:  
Product development in successful Japanese firms often involve overlap and extensive 
collaboration between different sections of the organization. Moreover, team members might 
move with the project “rugby style” as it progresses from conception towards fruition--in some 
cases staff might actually follow a project through the depart-mental locations associated with its 
development: thereby increasing the chance that solutions to current problems can be triggered 
by reference to first-hand experience of earlier difficulties. By contrast, Western approaches 
often involve considerable demarcation between departments which have rigid boundaries. There 
is widespread support for the idea that procedures should be well documented and less reliant on 
tacit knowledge which could be lost with the movement of a key individual. Product 
development can be characterized by being more analogous to a “relay race” in which the 
“baton” of project development is handed over from department to department with minimal 
interaction. Since “socialization” is impeded by such a rigid division of labor, the degree of tacit 
knowledge that can move with a project is relatively limited.23  
If future economic advantage is with the incremental innovation of complex technology and if 
the Japanese appear to have a cultural advantage at this point in time, what does this mean for 
U.S. technology policy?  
The future: Technology policy in a complex world 
We believe America’s technology policy must emphasize information flows that move 
innovation-relevant knowledge and capabilities across organizational boundaries. If nothing else, 
this involves removing obstacles to communication and interaction. Of primary importance is 
accelerating the process of knocking down the walls of separation standing between our public 
and private sectors. Those barriers only serve to ensure that both sectors are constantly confused 
about the intentions and actions of the other.  
A growing number of observers of technological innovation are finding it useful to speak in 
terms of national innovation systems,24 and we concur. A national innovation system 
encompasses the range of institutions (e.g., the education system, industrial relations, technical 
and scientific organizations, cultural traditions) that contribute to the advance of technology for 
commercialization. Thus, rather than focusing technology policy on discrete actions (e.g., 
support of R&D), in the future policy-making must take into account, in a systematic way, the 
relationships among sets of national institutions.  
Figure 2. Countries originating, commercializing, and leading in technological innovation  
Technology  R&D Originator Commercial Innovator Current Leader 
Advanced Composite 
Materials  U. S. U. S. Japan/U. S. 
Automobiles  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Biotechnology  U. S. U. S. U. S. 
Commercial Aircraft  Europe U. S. U. S. 
Consumer Electronics  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Desktop Computers  U. S. U. S. Japan/U. S. 
Fiber optics  U. S. U. S. U. S. 
Flat Panel Displays  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Fuzzy Logic  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Jet Engines  Europe Europe U. S. 
NC-Machine Tools  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Robotics  U. S. U. S. Japan 
Software  U. S. U. S. U. S. 
Television Sets  U. S. U. S. Japan 
VCRs U. S. U. S. Japan 
Bold indicates a change in leadership.  
Source: Gover, James. December, 1994. "Optimizing Federal Transfer to Promote Commercialization." Technology 
Transfer p. 37.  
Like Harvard economist Michael Porter, we believe the intensification of global competition has 
made the role of the nation-state more important, not less,25 and thus national technology policy 
is far from obsolete. This is especially the case to the degree that the interactions among national 
institutions comprise much of the tacit knowledge that seems so essential to modern 
innovation.26 But now technology policy has to be integrative, synthetic, and dynamic across the 
entire national landscape, particularly for complex technologies. Moving the U.S. national 
innovation system in this direction is a huge challenge. But unless policy changes of this 
magnitude can be undertaken, there is no way America will solve its trade and competitiveness 
problems.  
While we will not attempt prescriptions in any detail, it is possible to identify four functions 
government, on occasion, has served in the past. They are: Climate setting, surveying, marriage 
brokering, and gap filling.27  
Climate setting refers to government creating an environment conducive to commercial 
innovation, e.g., providing appropriately trained and educated personnel, adequate quantities of 
appropriately priced capital, a tax system that encourages innovation, the ability for 
organizations to work together without being accused of collusion, and the assurance of equal 
treatment in other countries’ markets.  
Surveying refers to the need for continuous monitoring of what is going on worldwide with 
regard to commercial technologies. Surveying provides a country and its industries with 
intelligence and is critical in an environment of continuous and rapidly changing technologies.  
The need for marriage brokering flows from two characteristics of much of contemporary 
technology. This technology is complex and it is the product of networks that carry out complex 
synthesis. Minimally, a government marriage brokering role is designed to assure that 
organizations that can contribute to a technological innovation know about each other’s 
capabilities and find it possible to interact with each other with relative ease.  
Gap filling is the most controversial of the technology policy functions. Gap filling implies that 
government will actively intervene to fill gaps if none of the other organizational components is 
willing or able to serve the needed functions. Historically, gap filling has been common in the 
commercial sector, for example, the National Bureau of Standards, now the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, played a critical standards setting role. Gap filling remains highly 
controversial, however, because it is where the “picking winners” issue arises. But it must be 
recognized that the very existence of a technology policy implies that winners are being picked. 
It is precisely because our national well-being has come to rest heavily on success in 
technological innovation that technology policy is a permanent fixture on the nation’s policy 
agenda.  
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